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Defense Affordability – Expensive 
Contracting Policies 
Eleanor Spector, VP Contracts, Navy Postgraduate School, 5/16/12 
“Commercial” Companies and DoD Business 
• Non-Government commercial companies find it virtually 
impossible to do business with DoD, other than for the 
sale of off-the-shelf commercial products. 
• Selling to the Government on a sole source or flexibly 
priced contract entails so many non-commercial type, 
expensive rules, that even largely “commercial” 
companies, such as Fluor or Boeing, create separate 
organizational entities that only sell to the Government.   
• Companies that specialize in DoD work, cannot be 
competitive in “commercial” sales because of the 
expensive administrative systems they have been forced 
to implement. 
1 
Status of Government Contracting 
•  Wide policy swings, often driven by political changes or isolated 
incidents of perceived contractor wrongdoing, have made the 
procurement process increasingly difficult and complex. 
•  New Government procurement regulations unlike standard 
business practices followed in commercial transactions on which 
the original FAR was based. (e.g., “Business Systems” rule, limits 
on reimbursability of executive compensation.) 
•  Increased bureaucracy.  As a new VP for Fluor contracts, I waited 
over 2 weeks to schedule an introductory courtesy meeting with a 
military contracting official while his staff processed my written 
“application” for the visit.  
• Washington Post indicates new businesses receiving federal 
contracts declined 14% in FY2011 – from 34,800 in 2010 to 29,800 
in 2011. 
2 
Expensive New Government Policy – Business 
Systems Rule 
♦ Business systems are purchasing, property management, cost 
estimating, EVMS, MMAS, accounting systems. 
 
♦ Will require more contractor personnel to prove these systems 
meet all Government requirements.  Will require more audits of the 
systems.  Withholding of payments permitted on all types of 
contracts, even those where Government does not withhold for 
failure to meet performance requirements.  Alternative is to use 
Sarbanes Oxley requirements to certify business systems for 
publicly traded firms.  
 
♦ In the commercial world, does the customer audit the business 
systems of the seller?  If the product meets requirements, are there 
withholds from the price for business systems non-compliance? 
3 
Expensive Policies - EVM 
 
• In a 2010 Grant Thornton survey of Government 
contractors, 25% of companies required to report 
under EVMS would adopt if they were not required to 
do so by the contract. 
• DoD should relook at the cost effectiveness of full 
EVM implementation, and the cost of traveling 
Government teams who evaluate EVM systems. 




DCAA Issues - Background 
♦ GAO issued 2 reports in 2008 finding that DCAA 
did not follow Generally Accepted Government  
Accounting Standards (GAGAS) on 14 audits. 
– Contractors and DoD contracts personnel improperly 
influenced audit scope, conclusions and opinions. 
– Working papers did not support reported opinions. 






♦ 8/08 – Discontinued participation in IPTs including proposal 
pricing and negotiation IPTs.  Refuse to adhere to requested 
timeframes for assist audits. 
♦ 12/08 – Imposed rigorous timelines for contractor responses to 
auditor requests for records and access to contractor 
personnel.  Also, an auditor may no longer find contractor 
control systems inadequate “in part,” and must suspend 
payment of invoices if a control objective not met. 
♦ 3/09 – Stated certain unsatisfactory conditions related to 
actions of Government officials to be reported to DoDIG, e.g. 
contracting officer ignores audit report and awards at 
“excessive” costs. 
6 
DCAA Reaction (continued) 
♦ 4/09 – Stated that if a billing system, or an accounting system 
that affects the billing system, has been significantly modified 
or a new system implemented, direct billing authority will be 
rescinded and will not be restored until DCAA determines the 
new system is adequate. 
♦ 7/09 – Proposes automatic withholding of 10% or more 
whenever a control system is found inadequate. 
♦ New DCAA policies delaying acquisition process by making 
DCAA less responsive and by having a chilling effort on 





DCAA - Impact 
♦ Enormous demands for cost data – especially subcontract data, on 
negotiated contracts. 
♦ Issuance of numerous “Form 1” final decisions, with contracting 
officers reluctant to overrule DCAA. 
♦ Protracted negotiation schedules, exacerbated by long waits for 
DCAA reports. 
♦ DCAA questioning small amounts of cost, with contractors having 
to spend resources to research responses. Implementing a $1,000 
threshold for questioning cost would cut the use of resources 
substantially and would entail minimal risk for Government. 
♦ While DCAA is employing resources on other matters, negotiation 
of forward pricing and final pricing rates has languished. (Fluor 
does not have final negotiated rates since 1995).  Result has been 
each contracting officer negotiating contract specific rates and 
inability to close thousands of open contracts. 
 
8 
Other Expensive Policies 
 
♦ Rule requiring separate calculations and negotiations to receive 
“preferred” performance based contract payments. 
♦ Imposition of CAS 401 and 402 (consistency standards) on foreign 
entities.  This will result in prime contractors and DCAA having to 
expend resources to try to implement U.S. cost accounting 
standards on foreign contractors. 
♦ Peer reviews – Contracting personnel should be capable of writing 
and negotiating contracts and running source selections.  Routine 
outside reviews ought not be necessary. 
♦ Elimination of contractors from competitions for proposing less 
expensive alternate solutions.  RFPs frequently disqualify 





Other Expensive Policies 
♦ Imposing FPI contracts as the norm without 
assessing the administration costs of such contracts 
and the complexity of closing them. 
 
♦ Disclosing to the CO and IG, and Government 
investigating disclosures of single digit mischarging 
under Mandatory Disclosure law, instead of just 
correcting the mischarging.  50% of disclosures are 
company discovered instances of mischarging. 
10 
Profit 
♦ Some DoD policy promulgations appear aimed at reducing 
contractor profits as a way of promoting affordability. Government 
Contracting is not a high profit business.   
♦ 2011 Grant Thornton study of Government contractors reports:  
–   31% of participants reported profit rates of 1–5% as a percentage of 
revenue (up from 31% in 2009) 
–   37% saw profit rates of 6–10%.  
–   18% reported profit rates of 11–15%.  
–   8% had profit rates above 15%.  
–   6% did not make a profit or had a loss. 
 
37% of government contractors did not make a profit, 
experienced a loss, or posted a profit at 1–5% of revenue. 
11 
Expensive Processes – Resolving Issues 
 
♦ In 2011 Grant Thornton study,  
 
•   19% rated relationship with auditors as fair or poor 
(compared with 11% in 2010). 
•   10% rated relationship with contracting officers as fair or 
poor (compared with 5% in 2010). 
 
♦ Lengthening times to settle issues with auditors and 





Government policy makers should: 
 
• Refrain from increasing the complexity of contracting rules. 
• Roll back clauses and policy that direct contractor focus away 
from providing a product or service and more toward perfecting 
its business systems. 
• Cease recent policy encouragement to reduce profits 
everywhere. 
• Reconsider cost effectiveness of rigid implementation of EVM. 
• Evaluate whether DCAA recommendations taking precedence 
over PCO and DCMA judgment is an effective use of 
resources.  
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